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People v. Drew: Adoption of the ALl Rule of
Insanity In California
Falling in line with prevailing trends of current psychological thought,
California becomes one of the most recent jurisdictions to abrogate the
age-old M'Naghten testfor insanity, in favor of the standard articulated by
the American Law Institute. The author, who views the change as a posi-
tive one, examines the projected implications of the new test from both the-
oretical and practical vantage points.
I. INTRODUCTION
People v. Drew' represents a change in California law regarding
the legal test to be used in determining the sanity of a criminal
defendant. By adding a volitional (i.e. the ability to control con-
duct) element to the sanity standard, this decision enlarges the
scope of factors considered by a court or jury in making a deter-
mination of a defendant's sanity.
The case is seen to be the culmination of a line of decisions
which had gradually departed from the strict cognitive view of
sanity set forth in the M'Naghten test.2 The California Supreme
Court, in discarding the M'Naghten approach for the American
1. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978). Prior
to this decision California used the M'Naghten test as a standard of legal sanity
which reads:
[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing the act, the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know
it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
2. People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 801, 394 P.2d 959, 962, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 274
(1964), modified M'Naghten by holding that the mere capacity to verbalize socially
acceptable answers to questions did not prove sanity; the defendant also had to
appreciate or understand the nature and wrongfulness of his act. People v. Gor-
shen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959); and People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d
53 (1949); initiated the development of the concept of diminished capacity, which
allowed a defendant to introduce evidence of mental incapacity to negate specific
intent, malice, or other subjective elements of the charged crime. People v. Can-
trell, 8 Cal. 3d 672, 685-86, 504 P.2d 1256, 1264-65, 105 Cal. Rptr. 792, 800-01 (1973),
held that the concept of "irresistible impulse" could be utilized to prove dimin-
ished capacity. This added a volitional element to the diminished capacity con-
cept but the availability of a defense of diminished capacity in the first place
turned on the nature of the crime charged. If the defendant was charged with a
general intent crime, he could not raise a defense of diminished capacity regard-
less of his impaired mental state. See also People v. Nance, 25 Cal. App. 3d 925,
Law Institute (ALI) standard,3 has joined several other states4
and federal courts5 in adopting a sanity standard which takes into
account volitional factors as well as cognitive factors in determin-
ing sanity.
It will be the aim of this note to examine the Drew decision and
to speculate upon its possible future impact on California law. In
so doing, essential elements of the newly-adopted ALI standard
and the M'Naghten test will be delineated and distinguished.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Drew became involved in a heated argument with another
customer at a bar during the early morning hours of October 26,
1975.6 The bartender phoned for police assistance. When the of-
ficers arrived and attempted to question the customer who had
been involved in the argument with Drew, Drew attempted to in-
terfere. Officer Bonsell then asked Drew to step outside. Drew
refused. At this point Bonsell and another officer attempted to es-
cort Drew outside, but he broke away and struck Officer Bonsell
in the face, causing him to strike his head against the edge of the
bar. Drew then fell on the fallen policeman and attempted to bite
him. He was finally restrained and arrested by other officers.
Drew was charged with battery on a police officer,7 obstructing
929, 102 Cal. Rptr. 266, 269 (1972); People v. Noah, 5 Cal. 3d 469, 477, 487 P.2d 1009,
1014, 96 Cal. Rptr. 441, 446 (1971).
3. The American Law Institute test reads: "A person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongful-
ness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."
MODEL PEN. CODE, Proposed Official Draft § 4.01, Subpart (1)(1962).
4. Alaska: Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907 (1973). Connecticut: CONN. GEN.
STATS., § 53a-13. Idaho: State v. White, 93 Idaho 153, 456 P.2d 797 (1969). Illinois:
ILL. REV. STATS., ch. 38, § 6-2. Indiana: Hill v. State, 252 Ind. 601, 251 N.E.2d 429
(1969). Kentucky: Terry v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862 (1963). Maryland: MD.
CODE, art. 59, § 25. Massachussetts: Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 226
N.E.2d 556 (1967). Missouri: REV. STATS. Mo. § 552.030(3) (1). Montana: MONT. REV.
CODES, § 95-501. Ohio: State v. Statten, 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 247 N.E.2d 293 (1969). Or-
egon: OR. REV. STAT. § 161.295(1). Rhode Island: State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469
(1979). Texas: TEX. PEN. CODE, § 8.01. Vermont: VT. STATS., Tit. 13 § 4801. Wiscon-
sin: State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458 (1966).
5. Federal Circuits-United States v. Brawner, 153 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 471 F.2d
969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970). Blake v.
United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969). United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th
Cir. 1968). United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968). United States v.
Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967). Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir.
1967). United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966). Wion v. United States,
325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963). United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3rd Cir. 1961).
6. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 337-38, 583 P.2d 1318, 1319-20, 149 Cal. Rptr.
275, 276-77, (1978) (statement of facts).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243 (Deering Supp. 1979).
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an officer,8 and disturbing the peace.9 To those charges he plead
not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.l0 At the guilt trial,
the jury, after hearing the testimony of the officers involved,
found Drew guilty as charged.
At the sanity trial, two court-appointed psychiatrists testified
that Drew suffered from "latent schizophrenia, characterized by
repeated incidents of assaultive behavior and by conversing with
inanimate objects and nonexistent persons .... "11 Both psychi-
atrists concluded that Drew was unable to appreciate the differ-
ence between right and wrong.
The trial court's instructions to the jury were based on the
M'Naghten test.12 The jury found Drew sane, 13 whereupon the
court sentenced him to prison on the battery conviction.
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 148 (Deering 1971).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (Deering Supp. 1979).
10. The California Penal Code provides for a bifurcation of the guilt and sanity
trials. The relevant section in pertinent part reads:
When a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, and also joins it
with another plea or pleas, he shall first be tried as if he had entered such
other plea or pleas only, and in such trial he shall be conclusively pre-
sumed to have been sane at the time the offense is alleged to have been
committed. If the jury shall find the defendant guilty, or if the defendant
pleads only not guilty by reason of insanity, then the question whether
the defendant was sane or insane at the time the offense was committed
shall be promptly tried, either before the same jury or before a new jury
in the discretion of the court. In such trial the jury shall return a verdict
either that the defendant was sane at the time the offense was committed
or that he was insane at the time the offense was committed. If the ver-
dict or finding be that the defendant was sane at the time the offense was
committed, the court shall sentence the defendant as provided by law
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1979).
11. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 338, 583 P.2d 1318, 1320, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 276
(1978).
12. The trial court instructed the jury that "legal insanity . . . means a dis-
eased or deranged condition of the mind which makes a person incapable of know-
ing or understanding the nature and quality of his act, or makes a person
incapable of knowing or understanding that his act was wrong." Id. at 339, 583
P.2d 1320, 149 Cal. Rptr. 277.
13. The jury apparently did not accept the psychiatric opinion offered at trial
which suggested that Drew was insane under the M'Naghten standard. According
to the California Supreme Court, this was probably due to the fact that no reason-
ing was presented by the psychiatric experts as to how they reached such a con-
clusion. Id. at 350-51, 583 P.2d at 1328, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 285. As the court stated in
an earlier case: "The chief value of an expert's testimony in this field, as in all
other fields, rests upon the material from which his opinion is fashioned and the
reasoning by which he progresses from his material to his conclusion ... ." (em-
phasis in original). People v. Bassett, 69 Cal. 2d 122, 141, 443 P.2d 777, 789, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 193, 205 (1968).
III. M'NAGHTEN TEST No LONGER VIABLE
The main issue considered by the California Supreme Court in
the Drew decision was whether the M'Naghten test was still via-
ble as a basis for determining sanity and, if not, what test should
be adopted in its place.14
The M'Naghten test traces its roots to an 1843 English decision
in which one Daniel M'Naghten, who had killed the British prime
minister's secretary while attempting to assassinate the prime
minister, was acquitted of murder charges by reason of insanity.i5
Queen Victoria was so disturbed by this acquittal that she com-
manded the House of Lords to obtain the opinion of the judges on
the law of insanity. The fifteen judges of the common law courts
were called in an extraordinary session to answer five hypotheti-
cal questions on the law of criminal responsibility.16 In respond-
ing to two of the questions asked, the judges stated what has
come to be regarded as the M'Naghten rule.' 7 From 1864 until the
decision in Drew, California used the M'Naghten rule to define in-
sanity in criminal cases.' 8
14. This issue was not presented to the court in the briefs of Drew in the
Court of Appeal nor in his petition for hearing, but the court found this case a suit-
able vehicle for resolution of the sanity issue. Therefore the court granted a hear-
ing and requested counsel by letter to submit briefs and present argument on the
M'Naghten issue. See People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 339 n.4, 583 P.2d 1318, 1320 n.4,
149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 277 n.4 (1978). See also In Re Smith, 3 Cal. 3d 192, 203 n.3, 474
P.2d 969, 976 n.3, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8 n.3 (1970).
15. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 340-41 583 P.2d 1318, 1320, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275,
278 (1979).
16. The five questions asked are as follows:
1.) What is the law respecting alleged crimes commited by persons af-
flicted with insane delusion, in respect of one or more particular sub-
jects or persons: as, for instance, where at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, the accused knew he was acting
contrary to law, but did the act complained of with a view, under the
influence of insane delusion, of redressing or revenging some sup-
posed grievance or injury, or of producing some supposed public ben-
efit?
2.) What are the proper questions to be submitted to the jury when a
person alleged to be afflicted with insane delusion respecting one or
more particular subjects or persons is charged with the commission
of a crime (murder, for example), and insanity is set up as a defense?
3.) In what terms ought the question to be left to the jury, as to the pris-
oner's state of mind at the time when the act was committed?
4.) If a person under an insane delusion as to existing facts commits an
offense in consequence thereof, is he thereby excused?
5.) The fifth question dealt with the admissibility of expert testimony.
H. WEIHOFFEN, MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 59-63 (1954). In re-
sponse to questions one and questions two and three (questions two and three
were considered together), the M'Naghten rule was laid down. Id. at 62-63.
17. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 341, 583 P.2d 1318, 1321, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 279
(1978).
18. See People v. Coffman, 24 Cal. 230, 235 (1864) (defendant charged with
murder, M'Naghten test adopted in California).
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The court in Drew mentioned several deficiencies of the
M'Naghten test.19 Foremost among these, according to the court,
is M'Naghten's exclusive focus upon a defendant's cognitive ca-
pacity. This cognitive approach grew out of an old psychological
theory that the mind could be divided up into several compart-
ments, each one of which could be diseased without affecting the
others.20 This theory is no longer considered viable.21 As stated
by Glueck in his criticism of the judges who formulated
M'Naghten:
[T]he judges take it for granted that a person can "labor under a partial
delusion only" and be "not in other respects insane," while it is well
known that there can be no delusions in any mental disease without ex-
pressing a condition of the mind as a whole and not of any presumable
disconnected portions thereof.2 2
Another deficiency of M'Naghten is that it does not address it-
self to the situation wherein a defendant can realize the differ-
ence between right and wrong, but is nevertheless incapable of
controlling his behavior.23
In light of modern knowledge, it is clear that the "right-wrong" test of
criminal responsibility is inadequate. There are many forms of mental ill-
ness where the illness may be serious enough to deprive the person con-
cerned of any actual choice of conduct where nonetheless he does possess
knowledge of what is right or wrong in legal or moral terms.2 4
The final aspect of the M'Nnaghten rule that the court criticized
in Drew was the restriction that M'Naghten places on psychiatric
testimony.25 Psychiatrists typically consider a wide range of
symptomatology in determining the mental condition of an indi-
19. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 341-44, 583 P.2d 1318, 1322-24, 149 Cal. Rptr.
275, 278-81 (1978).
20. Id. at 341, 583 P.2d at 1322, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 278. See also United States v.
Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 567 (3d Cir. 1951) (homicide case in which the court criticized
M'Naghten).
21. S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRImINAL LAW 171 (1927).
22. Id.
23. The concepts of diminished capacity and irresistible impulse were devel-
oped to deal with this problem but are still inadequate. See note 2, supra. An-
other problem with the diminished capacity concept is that, if proven successfully,
it results in the release of the defendant or his confinement as an ordinary crimi-
nal for a lesser term, thereby failing to identify the mentally disturbed defendant
and raising the possibility that he will not receive the care commensurate to his
condition. Such a defendant may serve his term, but, upon release, will continue
to represent a danger to the public. See BRAKEL AND RocK, THE MENTALLY Dis-
ABLED AND THE LAW 395 (1971).
24. United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 725 (6th Cir. 1968).
25. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 342-43, 583 P.2d 1318, 1323, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275,
279-80 (1978).
vidual.26 It was the court's view that requiring psychiatrists to de-
termine the criminal responsibility of a defendant based solely
upon that individual's ability to differentiate between right and
wrong was a limitation that was grossly overrestrictive. 27 Such re-
strictions, the court continued, have often resulted in severely in-
complete psychiatric evaluations. As a consequence, juries have
often returned verdicts of sanity despite plain evidence of serious
mental illness. 28
The criticisms of the M'Naghten standard levied by the court in
Drew echoed the views of numerous other authorities who have
criticized M'Naghten for its failure to include a volitional element
as part of its sanity test.29 It is noteworthy that there are several
European nations whose laws relating to insanity and criminal re-
sponsibility bear no relationship to the M'Naghten rule.30 The ad-
ministration of justice in those countries does not appear to have
suffered as a result.3 1
Because of the deficiencies in the M'Naghten test, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, using the vehicle of Drew, abandoned the
M'Naghten rule. The court apparently agreed with Dr. Philip
26. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 767 (3d Cir. 1961) (defendant con-
victed of a violation of national motor vehicle theft act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312; pleaded
insanity, the court rejected M'Naghten and adopted ALI standard of insanity).
27. Id.
28. See People v. Dennis, 177 Cal. App. 2d 655, 660 (1960) (defendant accused of
assault with intent to commit murder, found sane despite unanimous medical tes-
timony of insanity); People v. Fraters, 146 Cal. App. 2d 305, 306, 303 P.2d 588, 589
(1956) (defendant convicted of second degree murder, found sane despite long his-
tory of mental illness); People v. Harmon, 110 Cal. App. 2d 545, 553, 243 P.2d 15, 19
(1952) (murder case, defendant found sane despite testimony of three psychiatrists
stating otherwise); People v. Darling, 107 Cal. App. 2d 635, 641, 237 P.2d 691, 695
(1951) (incest case, defendant found sane despite expert testimony stating defend-
ant was insane); People v. Martin, 87 Cal. App. 2d 581, 588-89, 197 P.2d 379, 386-87
(1948) (murder case, defendant found sane despite testimony of fourteen expert
and lay witnesses to the contrary); People v. Denningham, 82 Cal. App. 2d 117, 119-
20, 185 P.2d 614, 616-17 (1947) (burglary case, defendant found sane despite evi-
dence of loss of memory); People v. Babcock, 57 Cal. App. 2d 54, 55-58, 134 P.2d 54,
55-56 (1943) (robbery case, defendant found sane despite evidence of experts and
hospital records tending to show that defendant was insane).
29. See e.g. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Dusky v.
United States, 295 F.2d 743, 759 (8th Cir. 1961); Durham v. United States, 94 U.S.
App. D.C. 228, 236-37 (1954); State v. White, 93 Idaho 153, 456 P.2d 797, 801 (1969);
GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 409 (1952); WEIHOFEN,
MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 1-9 (1954).
30. Bigg, Procedures For Handling The Mentally Ill Offender In Some Euro-
pean Countries, 29 TEMPLE L.Q. 254 (1956).
31. The emphasis, with respect to the mentally ill offender, is different in
many European countries than in countries such as ours where M'Naghten is still
used. While our emphasis seems to be on punishment of the offender, the focus in
many European countries is on rehabilitation of the mentally ill criminal by use of
scientific and humane procedures. Id. This difference in emphasis renders need-
less a test such as M'Naghten. Accordingly, the lack of M'Naghten in these coun-
tries does not interfere with the administration of justice.
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Roche who wrote: "We have reached a place where there is a con-
sensus that the M'Naghten test of responsibility in the defense of
insanity is no longer useful."32
IV. THE AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE TEST ADOPTED
In place of the old M'Naghten standard, the court in Drew
adopted the American Law Institute test 33 (hereinafter referred
to as the ALI test). This test was formulated after nine years of
extensive research by the American Law Institute.34 Before its
final articulation, drafts and redrafts of the test were submitted
to, and revised by, an advisory committee comprised of distin-
guished judges, lawyers, psychiatrists, and penologists.35 Finally,
in 1962, the definitive version of the test was adopted by the Insti-
tute.36 In California, Justice Mosk, in his dissent to People v. Kel-
ley,37 had urged the court to adopt the ALI test several years
earlier. The court declined the invitation at that time, and it was
not until Drew that the changeover occurred.
The differences between the two standards of sanity determina-
tion discussed here are striking and easily discernible. The ad-
vantages of the ALI approach are apparent. First, the ALI test
adds a volitional element which is missing in M'Naghten; namely,
the ability to conform to legal requirements. 38 Second, the all or
nothing language of M'Naghten is avoided by permitting a not
32. P. ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND 176 (1958). (This quotation found in People
v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 580, 516 P.2d 875, 886, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171, 182 (1973) (Mosk J.,
dissenting)).
33. See note 3 supra.
34. The American Law Institute was organized in 1923 by a distinguished
group of judges, lawyers and legal scholars as a permanent organization devoted
to the clarification and improvement of the law. It has devised formulations in the
fields of criminal procedure, evidence, commercial law, and criminal law. People v.
Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 581, 516 P.2d 875, 886, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171, 182 (1973). (See Mosk
J., dissenting).
35. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 622 (2d Cir. 1966) (2nd circuit criti-
cized and rejected M'Naghten in this case and adopted ALI).
36. Id.
37. People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1973)(See
Mosk J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 346, 583 P.2d at 1325, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 282. Volition, as used in the
context of this decision, means the ability to control one's conduct. BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1746 (4th ed. 1968). An example of volition vs. cognition would be if a
defendant who commits a crime knows (cognition) that what he did was wrong
but due to his mental condition (e.g. schizophrenia) was unable to control his con-
duct (volition).
guilty verdict based on substantial incapacity.3 9 As Justice Kauf-
man explained in United States v. Freeman: "By employing the
telling word 'substantial' to modify 'incapacity' the rule empha-
sizes that 'any' incapacity is not sufficient to justify avoidance of
criminal responsibility but that 'total' incapacity is also unneces-
sary."40 Third, the ALI test is broad enough to permit a psychia-
trist to present a full picture of the defendant's mental
impairments and flexible enough to adapt to future changes in
psychiatric theory and diagnosis. 41 Fourth, by referring to the de-
fendant's capacity to "appreciate" the wrongfulness of his con-
duct, the ALI test takes note of the fact that mere verbal
knowledge of right and wrong does not prove sanity.42 Intellec-
tual awareness that conduct is wrongful, when divorced from ap-
preciation or understanding of the moral or legal import of
behavior, can have little significance. 43
The ALI test, by viewing the mind as a unified entity, brings the
legal test of insanity into harmony with modern theory, which is
opposed to any concept which divides the mind into separate
39. Id. at 346, 583 P.2d at 1325, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 282. An example wherein an
accused could be found not guilty by reason of insanity under the ALl formula-
tion, but could be found sane and therefore criminally responsible under the
M'Naghten test, is in a case in which a defendant, suffering from a type of schizo-
phrenia which makes it impossible for him to control his conduct, is accused of a
general intent crime (i.e. rape, etc.). Assuming it can be shown that the defendant
knew the nature and quality of his act or that he knew his act was wrong, he
would be found sane under the traditional M'Naghten test. See note 1, supra. The
defense of diminished capacity would not be available in this hypothetical situa-
tion, because the defense of diminished capacity is only available for a specific in-
tent crime and cannot be used where a general intent crime is charged. See note
2, supra. Under the ALI formulation this defendant could be found insane, assum-
ing, of course, that it can be shown that the nature of the defendant's mental dis-
ease is such that he lacks substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law. See note 3, supra. Under the ALI test it makes no difference
that the defendant can appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of his act. As long
as he lacks the substantial capacity to control his conduct, he can be found insane.
As Justice Mosk stated earlier, under the ALI test the offender must be emotion-
ally as well as intellectually aware of his conduct in order to be found sane. Peo-
ple v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 582, 516 P.2d 875, 887, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171, 183 (1973) (Mosk
J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
40. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 622-23 (2d Cir. 1966).
41. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 346, 583 P.2d 1318, 1325, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 282
(1978).
42. The AL formulation is consistent with the concept that mere verbal
knowledge of right and wrong does not prove sanity. This concept was expressed
by the court earlier when M'Naghten was modified to recognize this. See People v.
Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964). See also note 2 supra.
43. Justice Kaufman noted that the ALI test, by using the word "appreciate"
instead of "know" in the first branch of the test, acknowledges the fact that mere
intellectual awareness that conduct is wrongful, when divorced from appreciation
or understanding of the moral or legal impact of behavior, is not significant.
United States v. Freemen, 357 F.2d 606, 623 (2d Cir. 1966). (Kaufman J. wrote the
majority opinion which adopted the ALI test in that jurisdiction).
[Vol. 7: 445, 1980] People v. Drew
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compartments as the M'Naghten test does.4 4 The ALI test, more-
over, reflects awareness that from the perspective of psychiatry,
absolutes are ephemeral and gradations are inevitable.45 As the
commentary to the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code
observes, "The law must recognize that when there is no black
and white it must content itself with different shades of gray."46
Many thoughtful observers assert that the ALI test is a signifi-
cant improvement over the M'Naghten rule.47 These writers gen-
erally agree that by adding a volitional aspect to a sanity
determination, the ALI test allows a more accurate evaluation of
an accused's state of mind at the time of the offense than does the
M'Naghten rule. The court, in adopting the ALI test stated:
"[A] dhering to the fundamental concepts of free will and criminal
responsibility, the American Law Institute test restates
M'Naghten in language consonant with the current legal and psy-
chological thought."48 While California's abandonment of
M'Naghten and adoption of the ALI test was not without criti-
cism, 49 the court felt that the continuing inadequacy of
M'Naghten could not be cured by the creation of additional con-
cepts (i.e. diminished capacity) designed to evade its limita-
tions.50 In the court's opinion, the ALI test, having won
44. Id. at 623.
45. Id.
46. ALI, MODEL PEN. CODE, Tent. Drafts, 1-4 (1962).
47. See e.g. People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 581, 516 P.2d 875, 886-87, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 171, 182-83 (1973)(See Mosk J., dissenting); FINGARETrE, THE MEANING OF
CRIMINAL INSANITY 242 (1972); WECHSLER, CODIFICATION OF CRIMINAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 24 (1968); GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 86 (1967).
48. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 345, 583 P.2d 1318, 1324, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 281
(1978).
49. Justices Richardson, Clark, and Manuel dissented to the majority opinion
mainly on the grounds that M'Naghten was firmly imbedded in California's crimi-
nal law by precedent and legislative inaction, therefore any changes to the law
governing sanity standards was solely within the purview of the legislature. Id. at
352-62, 583 P.2d at 1329-35, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 286-92 (JJ. Richardson and Clark, dis-
senting). The majority opinion rejected this argument stating that the M'Naghten
rule, never having been enacted by the legislature, was not an integral part of the
statutory structure of California's criminal law. Thus, the court stated, "Replace-
ment of the M'Naghten rule with the ALI test will not contradict or nullify any leg-
islative enactment." Id. at 347, 583 P.2d at 1325-26, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 282-83.
50. Id. at 345, 583 P.2d at 1324, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 281. The court, having decided
to replace M'Naghten with the ALI standard, remanded the Drew case for retrial
on the sanity issue. Id. at 352, 583 P.2d at 1329, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 286. Information
received from the Superior Court of Imperial County, the court of the original ju-
widespread acceptance, 51 is the best replacement for M'Naghten
now available. 52
V. FUTURE IMPACT
California's decision to discard the M'Naghten test in favor of
the more flexible ALI standard can be viewed as having its great-
est impact principally in two areas.
A. Expert Psychiatric Testimony Broadened
Perhaps the greatest impact of Drew will be felt in the area of
psychiatric testimony at trial. Prior to adoption of the ALI test,
testifying psychiatrists were restricted to examining the question
of the defendant's knowledge of right and wrong. This restriction
placed the psychiatrist in a position in which he was compelled to
render what is essentially a moral judgment. As a consequence,
there resulted a certain unavoidable usurpation of the jury's func-
tion.53 Under the ALI formulation, the use of meaningful psychi-
atric testimony is permitted.5 4 A testifying psychiatrist can now
paint a complete picture of the defendant's mental state, enabling
the jury to make its decisions and judgments more fully ap-
risdiction, revealed that Drew was not retried due to inadvertance on the part of
the district attorney's office. The case against Drew was never refiled.
A recent case has indicated that the ALI standard will be applied retroactively
in cases where the M'Naghten test had been used and the possibility exists that
the result would have differed had ALI been applied. See C.A. 1st, 1 Crim. 18496
Oct. 31, 1979.
51. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 345, 583 P.2d 1318, 1324, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 281
(1978).
52. Id.
53. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 767 (3rd Cir. 1961) (usurping of jury
function one of main criticisms this court levied against the M'Naghten test).
54. Expert psychiatric testimony which would be considered relevant under
the ALI test and not under M'Naghten would be testimony tending to show that a
defendant could not control his actions even though he can discern the difference
between right and wrong. An example of this would be a case where the expert
psychiatric testimony is to the effect that a defendant suffers from schizophrenia
such that his illness is characterized by a disintegration of the personality, a com-
plete disassociation between intellect and emotion, an incapacity to think concep-
tually, and an impairing of his judgment to a considerable degree. Under
M'Naghten this defendant probably would be found sane since his illness does not
affect his "concrete" thinking (as opposed to conceptual thinking), and thus his
ability to discern right from wrong. Under the ALI test the fact that the defendant
knew right from wrong does not preclude a finding of insanity, because the testi-
mony describing the defendant's illness would tend to show that he was incapable
of controlling his actions. Therefore, the ALI test makes relevant the complete
psychiatric picture of the defendant, not merely that portion relating to his ability
to discern right from wrong. An example of a case where a defendant was found
sane under M'Naghten despite an illness similar to the one just described can be
found in People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
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praised of the facts.5 5 As stated by the majority opinion in United
States v. Freeman:
The most modern psychiatric insights will be available, but, even more im-
portantly, the legal focus will be sharper and clearer. The twin branches
of the test, significantly phrased in the alternative, will remove from the
pale of criminal sanctions precisely those who are in no meaningful sense
responsible for their actions.
5 6
Generally speaking, jurors are acutely conscious of their re-
sponsibilities as jurors, and they prefer for the most part a divi-
sion of labor whereby the experts advise and they, the jurors,
decide whether the defendant was responsible for his behavior.57
The adoption of the ALI test solidifies this division of labor as it
relates to the sanity trial.
B. Increase in Sanity Hearings
A second significant impact of the Drew decision will be felt in
the area of the number of sanity hearings actually held. Statistics
indicate that prior to the Drew decision in November of 1978,
there was an average of twenty-one sanity hearings conducted
each month in Los Angeles County.5 8 Since the Drew decision,
the number of sanity hearings per month has remained approxi-
mately the same. However, the total number of criminal filings in
Los Angeles County in that same time span has decreased by 30
to 40%. It is evident, therefore, that in relation to the total
number of criminal filings, the number of sanity hearings has in-
creased since Drew.5 9 Although this could be due to other nonap-
parent factors, it is suggested that by broadening the scope of
factors considered in a sanity determination, the ALI sanity stan-
dard has made the insanity defense available to persons having
types of mental impairments not previously recognized under
55. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 623 (2d Cir. 1966) (court pointed out
some advantages of the ALI test in this case).
56. Id. at 623.
57. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANrry 218 (1967).
58. This information was obtained from the statistical analysis department of
the Superior Court of Los Angeles and may be representative of statewide trends.
The decrease in the total number of criminal filings since the Drew decision is due
to policy changes by the District Attorney regarding criminal prosecution. Statis-
tics were not available for defendants who did not join the plea of insanity with
another plea. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1979). This discrepancy
may render the apparent statistical increase in sanity hearings invalid; but it must
also be noted that these statistics have remained constant since Drew through
June, 1979, giving them some apparent validity.
59. Id.
M'Naghten. For example, a defendant having a mental deficiency
affecting his volitional capacity but not his cognitive ability to dif-
ferentiate between right and wrong, (i.e. forms of schizophrenia)
can now be found insane, a finding which would have not oc-
curred under the old M'Naghten approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
People v. Drew does not represent such a radical departure
from the prior test of sanity in California as might be imagined.60
It appears, rather, to be another step in the progression of Califor-
nia's sanity law, as were the concepts of irresistible impulse and
diminished capacity.61 The Drew decision does, however, repre-
sent what seems to be a positive change in the law. By recogniz-
ing the volitional as well as the cognitive aspects of sanity, the
ALI formulation brings the law more in step with modern psycho-
logical theory. It appears that this change will allow a more accu-
rate determination to be made of an accused's criminal
responsibility for his actions, by permitting more complete psy-
chiatric testimony. It is anticipated by this writer that the court
will continue to modify the law in this area as further advances in
the psychological sciences reveal a need to do s0.
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60. The California Supreme Court also seemed to view their decision as more
of a progression in the law of sanity rather than a radical departure from previous
precedent. See People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 348, 583 P.2d 1318, 1326, 149 Cal. Rptr.
275, 283 (1978).
61. See note 2 supra. (Concepts of irresistible impulse and diminished capac-
ity set forth).
62. On Monday, January 21, 1980, the California Assembly Criminal Justice
Committee defeated a bill (A.B. 1907 by Assemblyman McAlister, D-San Jose)
which would have resurrected the M'Naghten rule and abolished the ALI test.
The Los Angeles Daily Journal, Jan. 23, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
